Showing posts with label time-barred-debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label time-barred-debt. Show all posts

11 October 2026

Cheque Issued Against a Time-Barred Debt: Kerala High Court Reaffirms Section 138 Liability

Cheque Issued Against a Time-Barred Debt: Kerala High Court Reaffirms Section 138 Liability


Introduction

A recurring defence in cheque-dishonour prosecutions is that the cheque was issued towards a debt which had become time-barred and therefore was not a “legally enforceable debt” under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Kerala High Court’s recent decision in G. Sanil Kumar v. Sujith, Crl. A. No. 2002 of 2024, decided on 8 October 2026, gives important practical support to complainants facing this defence.


The Court held that issuance of a cheque towards repayment of a time-barred debt is not legally prohibited, and that its dishonour can attract prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act where the cheque has revived the limitation period.


Facts of the case

The complainant alleged that the accused had borrowed ₹9,30,230 through multiple transactions during 2011 and 2012. The accused later issued a cheque dated 6 July 2015 for the same amount towards repayment. The cheque was returned unpaid with the endorsement “funds insufficient”, and payment was not made despite a statutory demand notice.


The Magistrate acquitted the accused solely on the reasoning that the cheque related to a time-barred debt and therefore did not represent a legally enforceable debt for Section 138. The complainant challenged that acquittal before the Kerala High Court.


Kerala High Court’s holding

Justice A. Badharudeen held that the time-barred character of the underlying debt, by itself, does not make a Section 138 prosecution impermissible. The Court observed:

  • “When a cheque is issued towards a time-barred debt by reviving the period of limitation, merely for the reason that the cheque was issued towards a time-barred debt does not make a prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act impermissible.”


The Court set aside the acquittal, convicted the accused, and imposed one day’s simple imprisonment together with a fine of ₹14 lakh. Of that amount, ₹13.5 lakh was directed to be paid as compensation to the complainant and ₹50,000 as costs to the State; default was made punishable with six months’ imprisonment.


Reconciling limitation with Section 138

The decision is best understood by separating three distinct concepts:


Concept

Effect

Existence of debt

Limitation generally does not extinguish the debt; it bars the ordinary remedy of recovery through court process.

Voluntary payment

A debtor remains free to pay a time-barred debt voluntarily, and a creditor may accept such payment.

Legal enforceability

A fresh written and signed promise to pay a time-barred debt may create an enforceable contractual obligation under Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.


This approach reconciles Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, and B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates. Those decisions recognise that limitation ordinarily bars the remedy but does not necessarily extinguish the debt or prohibit voluntary payment.


However, Section 138 requires a “legally enforceable debt or other liability.” Therefore, the mere fact that the original debt remains unpaid does not by itself satisfy Section 138. The critical link is whether the cheque, issued after limitation, amounts to a written and signed promise to pay the identified debt.


Role of Section 25(3), Contract Act

Section 25(3) of the Contract Act validates a written and signed promise to pay wholly or partly a debt which the creditor could not enforce because of limitation. A cheque, being a written and signed instrument, may constitute such a promise where it is issued voluntarily towards repayment of the identified debt. The Supreme Court in K. Hymavathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh also recognised that a cheque can amount to a promise governed by Section 25(3).


In G. Sanil Kumar, the cheque was issued for the exact amount alleged to be due, namely ₹9,30,230, and was stated to have been issued towards repayment of the borrowings. That factual foundation was central to the Court’s conclusion that the time-barred nature of the original debt did not defeat the Section 138 prosecution.


What must be proved

A complainant relying on a cheque issued towards a time-barred debt should ordinarily establish:

  • the original transaction and the amount advanced or due;

  • the date on which the debt became due or repayment became enforceable;

  • expiry of limitation, if that is the complainant’s own position;

  • that the cheque was issued voluntarily by the drawer or authorised agent;

  • that the cheque was issued towards repayment, wholly or partly, of the identified debt;

  • that the cheque amount corresponds to the liability existing on the date of presentation;

  • presentation of the cheque within its validity period;

  • dishonour and the statutory notice;

  • non-payment within fifteen days of receipt of notice; and

  • timely filing of the complaint.


The presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act assist the complainant once execution of the cheque is established. The accused may rebut them by showing that the cheque was not issued towards the alleged debt, was unauthorised, or did not represent the actual liability at presentation.


Limits of the ruling

The Kerala High Court’s ruling does not mean that every cheque issued after expiry of limitation automatically attracts Section 138. The decision proceeds on the footing that the cheque was issued towards repayment of the alleged debt and thereby revived the limitation period.


The defence remains available where the accused establishes that:

  • the cheque was not issued towards the alleged debt;

  • it was issued only as accommodation;

  • the alleged transaction was illegal or void;

  • the cheque was forged, materially altered or unauthorised;

  • the amount claimed does not correspond to the liability due on presentation; or

  • part-payment or adjustment had reduced the liability before presentation.


In Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, the Supreme Court held that the cheque must represent the legally enforceable liability existing on the date of presentation. Where part-payment had reduced the liability before presentation, an unendorsed cheque for the original amount could not sustain Section 138 liability.


Practical significance

G. Sanil Kumar is significant because it rejects a mechanical acquittal based only on the plea that the original debt was time-barred. The correct judicial enquiry is whether the cheque itself, or the surrounding documents, establishes a fresh written promise to pay the identified debt under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act.


For complainants, the decision underscores the importance of obtaining or preserving written acknowledgments, settlement letters, balance confirmations, emails or messages identifying the cheque as repayment of the outstanding debt. For accused persons, the decision confirms that a bare assertion of limitation may not suffice, the precise purpose of issuance and the liability existing at presentation must be examined.


Conclusion

The Kerala High Court has correctly reconciled limitation law with cheque-dishonour liability. A time-barred debt may not be recoverable through an ordinary civil suit, but a voluntary written and signed promise to pay it, including an appropriately issued cheque, can create an enforceable obligation under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act. If that cheque is dishonoured and all statutory requirements of Section 138 are satisfied, prosecution is maintainable.


The governing principle may therefore be stated as follows:

  • A cheque issued towards a time-barred debt does not automatically escape Section 138 merely because the original debt had become barred by limitation. If the cheque amounts to a written and signed promise to pay the identified debt, thereby reviving enforceability under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act, its dishonour may attract Section 138 of the NI Act.


Disclaimer: The sole purpose of this blog is to create awareness on the subject and must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision, commercial or otherwise. One must do his own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this blog.

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References;

1. G. Sanil Kumar v. Sujith, Crl. A. No. 2002 of 2024. Livelawbiz


2. Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel Vs. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1497 of 2022) 

  • “It has already been concluded above that the offence under Section 138 arises only when a cheque that represents a part or whole of the legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment is returned by the bank unpaid. Since the cheque did not represent the legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment, the offence under Section 138 is not made out.”


3. K. Hymavathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [Criminal Appeal No. 2743 OF 2023 @ SLP (Crl) No. 7455 of 2019]

  • “ # 10. From a perusal of the legal position enunciated, itis crystal clear that this Court keeping in perspective the nature of the proceedings arising under the NI Act and also keeping in view that the cheque itself is a promise to pay even if the debt is barred by time has in that circumstance kept in view the provision contained in Section 25(3) of the Contract Act and has indicated that if the question as to whether the debt or liability being barred by limitation was an issue to be considered in such proceedings, the same is to be decided based on the evidence to be adduced by the parties since the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. It is only in cases wherein an amount which is out and out non-recoverable, towards which a cheque is issued, dishonoured and for recovery of which a criminal action is initiated, the question of threshold jurisdiction will arise. In such cases, the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC will be justified in interfering but not otherwise. In that light, this Court was of the view that entertaining a petition under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings at the stage earlier to the evidence would not be justified.”


4. B.K. Educational Services Private Limited Vs. Parag Gupta Associates (Civil Appeal  No.23988 of 2017).

  • “ . . . .In the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay [AIR 1958 SC 328] it has been held that when the debt becomes time-barred the amount is not recoverable lawfully through the process of the court, but it will not mean that the amount has become not lawfully payable. Law does not bar a debtor to pay nor a creditor to accept a barred debt. “


5. Punjab National Bank And Ors vs Surendra Prasad Sinha (Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1992). 

  • "The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy  the rights of the parties.  Section 3 of  the Limitation Act only bars the remedy, but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. The right to  the debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by the limitation. Only exception in which the remedy also becomes  barred  by limitation is the right is destroyed.  Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process  is barred, the right to debt remains. The time barred debt does not cease to exist by reason of s.3. That right can be exercised in any other manner than by means of a suit. The debt is not extinguished, but the remedy to enforce the liability is destroyed.  What s.3. refers only to the remedy but not to the right of the creditors. Such debt continues to subsists so long as it is not paid. It is not obligatory to file a suit to recover the debt."

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22 December 2024

Verification of Claims in CIRP & Doctrine of “Debts Due and Payable”.

 Verification of Claims in CIRP & Doctrine of “Debts Due and Payable”.

Currently there are two schools of thought, for application of the provisions of “The Limitation Act” in verification of claims of creditors by IRP/RP during CIRP, received in response to  Public announcement.

  1. Some of the IRP/RP;s are of the view that the provisions of “The Limitation Act”. are applicable for the claims received in response to public announcement during CIRP.

  2. Whereas some of the IRP/RP’s are of the view that the provisions of “The Limitation Act” are not applicable for the claim received during CIRP.


Let’s look into the definition of claim as per the Code & observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in various judgements.


Definition of Claim, Section 3(6) of the Code;

# Section 3(6) “claim” means; –

(a) a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;

(b) right to remedy for breach of contract under any law for the time being in force, if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured;

# Section 3(11) “debt” means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a financial debt and operational debt;

# Section 3(12) “default” means non-payment of debt when whole or any part or instalment of the amount of debt has become due and payable and is not paid by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be;

# Section 238A. Limitation. – The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings or appeals before the Adjudicating Authority, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.


What is conspicuous by its absence in this Section (238A) are the expressions “under this Act” or “subject to the provisions of this Act”. Thus Section 238A restricts the application of The Limitation Act to the proceedings or appeals before the Adjudicating Authority, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal only.


Important SCI judgements on Limitation & debts due and payable.

i). Hon’ble SCI (1992.04.20) Punjab National Bank And Ors vs Surendra Prasad Sinha (Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1992.) held that;

  • "The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy  the rights of the parties.  Section 3 of  the Limitation Act only bars the remedy, but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. The right to  the debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by the limitation. Only exception in which the remedy also becomes  barred  by limitation is the right is destroyed.  Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process  is barred, the right to debt remains. The time barred debt does not cease to exist by reason of s.3. That right can be exercised in any other manner than by means of a suit. The debt is not extinguished, but the remedy to enforce the liability is destroyed.  What s.3. refers only to the remedy but not to the right of the creditors. Such debt continues to subsists so long as it is not paid. It is not obligatory to file a suit to recover the debt."


ii). Hon’ble SCI (2018.10.11) in B.K. Educational Services Private Limited Vs. Parag Gupta and Associates [Civil Appeal  No.23988 of 2017] observed as under;

  • # 19. Shri Dholakia also referred to and relied upon Section 60 and 61 of the Contract Act which are set out hereunder:

  • “60. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is not indicated.—Where the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits. 

  • 61. Application of payment where neither party appropriates.—Where neither party makes any appropriation the payment shall be applied in discharge of the debts in order of time, whether they are or are not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits. If the debts are of equal standing, the payment shall be applied in discharge of each proportionably.”

  • These Sections also recognize the fact that limitation bars the remedy but not the right. In the context in which Section 60 appears, it is interesting to note that Section 60 uses the phrase “actually due and payable to him….” whether its recovery is or is not barred by the limitation law. The expression “actually” makes it clear that in fact a debt must be due and payable notwithstanding the law of limitation. From this, it is very difficult to infer that in the context of the Contract Act, the expression “due and payable” by itself would connote an amount that may be due even though it is time-barred, for otherwise, it would be unnecessary for Section 60 to contain the word “actually” together with the later words, “whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits”.

  • # 20. Shri Dholakia went on to cite Bhimsen Gupta v. Bishwanath Prasad Gupta, (2004) 4 SCC 95, and In re Sir Harilal Nemchand Gosalia, AIR 1950 Bom 74, for the proposition that debts “due and payable” must be differentiated from debts “due and recoverable”. .

  • In the former case, Section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 provided for eviction of a tenant where the amount of two months’ rent “lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him” was in arrears. This Court followed Bombay Dyeing (Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328 ), stating as follows:

  • “6. Section 11 of the said Act, 1982 deals with eviction of tenants. It begins with non obstante clause. It states that notwithstanding anything  contained in any contract or law to the contrary, no tenant shall be liable to be evicted except in execution of a decree passed by the court on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Sections 11(1)(a) to (f). In this case we are concerned with the ground of default which falls under Section 11(1)(d) and which states that where the amount of two months’ rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by reason of non-payment within the time fixed by the contract or in the absence of such contract by the last day of the month next following that for which rent is payable then such default would constitute ground for eviction. It is interesting to note that the expression used in Section 11(1)(d) is “lawfully payable” and not “lawfully recoverable” and therefore, Section 11(1) (d) has nothing to do with recovery of arrears of rent. On the contrary, Section 11(1)(d) provides a ground for eviction of the tenant in the eviction suit. It is well settled that law of limitation bars the remedy of the claimant to recover the rent for the period beyond three years prior to the institution of the suit, but that cannot be a ground for defeating the claim of the landlord for decree of eviction on satisfaction of the ingredients of Section 11(1)(d) of the said Act, 1982. In the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay [AIR 1958 SC 328] it has been held that when the debt becomes time-barred the amount is not recoverable lawfully through the process of the court, but it will not mean that the amount has become not lawfully payable. Law does not bar a debtor to pay nor a creditor to accept a barred debt.”

  • It is clear that this judgment will have no application to the present case as Section 11(1)(d) had nothing to do with  recovery of arrears of rent, but furnished a ground for evicting the tenant, this being the context in which the words “lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him” had been used. This Court correctly held that the right to evict the tenant cannot be affected as the law of limitation has reference only to the remedy of recovery of arrears of rent, and such law cannot be held to stand in the way of the right to evict the tenant.

  • Similarly, in Sir Harilal Nemchand Gosalia (supra), the expression used is “amount of debts due and owing from the deceased, payable by law out of the estate” which appeared in the third schedule of the Court Fee Act, 1870. It was held that an executor of a will is entitled to pay time-barred debts and cannot be confused with a creditor who may sue the executor in relation to those debts. The creditor would fail in his action because although the debt subsists, the remedy has been extinguished due to the law of limitation. Since the executor is duty bound to pay the amounts due and owing under the will without going to Court, he is entitled to pay a time-barred debt. This, the Court held, is made clear by Section 323 of the Succession Act, 1925, which made no exception in case of time-barred debts. It is in this context that the Court noted the difference between “payable” and “recoverable”.


iii). Hon’ble SCI (2024.12.20) in China Development Bank Vs. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. and Ors.  [(2024) ibclaw.in 340 SC, Civil Appeal No.7298 of 2022 with Civil Appeal No. 7407, 7615 and 7328 of 2022 and Civil Appeal No. 7434 of 2023] held that;

  • # 48.  . . . . . .In terms of sub-section (11) of Section 3, debt is a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a financial debt or operational debt. As noted earlier, a claim is a right to payment whether or not, such right is reduced to judgment and whether it is disputed or undisputed. The right to payment can be legal, equitable, secured or unsecured. Therefore, if there is a liability or obligation in respect of a payment which is disputed, it still becomes a claim. Once there is a liability or obligation in respect of a claim, it becomes a debt. Once there is a financial debt, the person to whom a debt is owed, becomes a Financial Creditor.

  • # 65. Another argument was canvassed based on the definition of ‘claim’ under Section 3(6) of the IBC. If the right to payment exists or if a breach of contract gives rise to a right to payment, the definition of ‘claim’ is attracted. Even if that right cannot be enforced by reason of the applicability of the moratorium, the claim will still exist. Therefore, whether the cause of action for invoking the guarantee has arisen or not is not relevant for considering the definition of ‘claim’.


Hon’ble Supreme Court in China Development Bank Vs. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. and Ors., emphasised that though the right to invoke the guarantee is restricted due to moratorium, the claim still exists. Similarly, with the same analogy, due to expiry of limitation, the right to enforce the debt is restricted, but the claim still exists.


In light of the definition of the “claim” & other provisions of the Code read with the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in various judgements mentioned supra above, it can be safely deduced that the claims received during CIRP are Debts Due and Payable”, irrespective of limitation.


References;

  1.  Hon’ble SCI (20.04.1992) Punjab National Bank And Ors vs Surendra Prasad Sinha (Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1992.)

  2. SCI (11.10.2018) in B.K. Educational Services Private Limited Vs. Parag Gupta Associates (Civil Appeal  No.23988 of 2017)

  3. SCI (2024.12.20) in China Development Bank Vs. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. and Ors.  [(2024) ibclaw.in 340 SC, Civil Appeal No.7298 of 2022 with Civil Appeal No. 7407, 7615 and 7328 of 2022 and Civil Appeal No. 7434 of 2023]

  4. SCI (03.02.2004) in Bhimsen Gupta v. Bishwanath Prasad Gupta, [(2004) 4 SCC 95].

  5. SCI (20.12.1957) in Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 328)

  6. High Court Bombay (25.07.1949) In re Sir Harilal Nemchand Gosalia, (AIR 1950 Bom 74).


Disclaimer: The sole purpose of this blog is to create awareness on the subject and must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision. A reader must do his own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this blog.


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