25 July 2026

Treatment of Counter Claim in Financial Creditor’s claim in CIRP

 Treatment of Counter Claim in Financial Creditor’s claim in CIRP


Pendency of a counterclaim before the DRT does not, by itself, render the financial creditor’s claim a “disputed claim” so as to require the IRP/RP to notionally admit it for Rs. 1.00 in a CIRP under the IBC. For a financial creditor, the statutory test under Section 7 is the existence of a financial debt and default; an unadjudicated counterclaim does not extinguish the debt or suspend the creditor’s right to invoke insolvency.


Issues

  1. Whether a pending counterclaim before the DRT changes the character of the bank’s claim in CIRP.

  2. Whether the IRP/RP is bound to treat such claim as a disputed claim and admit it only nominally for Rs. 1.00.

  3. What is the correct approach to claim verification under the IBC when a counterclaim is pending elsewhere.indiacode+1


Analysis

Section 5(8) of the IBC defines “financial debt,” and Section 7 enables initiation of CIRP on proof of debt and default. The Code does not make pendency of a dispute or counterclaim a precondition to maintainability of a financial creditor’s application; that concept is materially relevant in operational debt matters, not financial debt matters.


The CIRP framework requires the IRP/RP to receive, verify, and collate claims under the regulations, particularly Regulation 13 of the CIRP Regulations. That exercise is evidentiary and administrative: the IRP/RP must examine the loan documents, account statements, and default record, and then admit the claim to the extent it is verifiable. A pending DRT counterclaim may be noted, but it does not automatically reduce an otherwise established financial debt to a token amount.


The NCLAT in Mr. G. Sundaravadivelu v. Indian Overseas Bank held that pendency of proceedings before the DRT is not a bar to initiation of CIRP and that the NCLT need not await the DRT’s decision while deciding the Section 7 application. That authority supports the proposition that parallel DRT proceedings do not control the insolvency jurisdiction.


The Supreme Court reporting in B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India is even more directly relevant on the effect of counterclaims. It states that an unadjudicated counterclaim for damages does not extinguish an admitted financial debt or suspend the creditor’s statutory right to initiate insolvency proceedings. Therefore, unless the counterclaim has been adjudicated and has resulted in a legally effective set-off or extinguishment of debt, the claim cannot be reduced to Rs. 1.00 merely because the debtor has raised a counterclaim.verdictum


Conclusion

On the present issue, the legally sound position is that pendency of a counterclaim before the DRT does not make the bank’s financial claim a disputed claim requiring notional admission for Rs. 1.00. The IRP/RP should verify and admit the bank’s claim on the basis of the proved financial debt and default, while separately recording the pending counterclaim; only a binding adjudication affecting the debt may justify reduction of the admitted amount.


Suggested formulation

“Under Sections 5(8) and 7 of the IBC read with Regulation 13 of the CIRP Regulations, the IRP/RP is required to verify and collate the financial creditor’s claim on the basis of the proved debt and default. Pendency of an unadjudicated counterclaim before the DRT does not, by itself, convert such claim into a disputed claim or warrant notional admission for Rs. 1.00.”


Disclaimer: The sole purpose of this blog is to create awareness on the subject and must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision, commercial or otherwise. One must do his own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this blog.

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7 July 2026

Section 55(6)(b) of TPA - Statutory charge on the seller’s interest in the property

Section 55(6)(b) of TPA - Statutory charge on the seller’s interest in the property

Basic idea of the statutory charge

Section 55(6)(b) TPA creates, by operation of law, a statutory charge on the seller’s interest in the property for the purchase money (and interest/costs) properly paid by the buyer, so long as the buyer has not “improperly declined to accept delivery.” This charge is in the nature of a security interest, not a transfer of ownership, and it is enforceable against the seller and all persons claiming under him.


The key practical questions are: how is this charge enforced, against whom , and within what limitation period

.

Courts have consistently treated the buyer’s charge under section 55(6)(b) as a charge enforceable by a civil suit, akin to suits to enforce a mortgage or charge under Article 62 of theLimitation Act. In practice, enforcement typically takes one of these forms:


Suit to enforce charge on the property: A buyer who has paid advance/purchase money and is not in default can sue for recovery of that money with interest and seek enforcement of the statutory charge on the property, including sale of the charged property to realise the amount, under the Code of CivilProcedure’s execution machinery, in the same manner as a mortgage/charge decree.


Enforcement against “substituted security” 

The Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd.  AIR 2000 SC 573, held that the buyer’s charge under section 55(6)(b) is a statutory charge on the vendor's interest, and if that property is converted into another property or money, the charge fastens on such substituted property or money as well. Thus, a decree enforcing the charge can reach the substituted asset.


Against persons claiming under the seller:

The charge is enforceable “against all persons claiming under him”, whether or not theyhad notice of the charge. Following DDA v. Skipper Construction, courts have recognised that subsequent purchasers or claimants under the seller can be proceeded against to theextent of the charged interest.


Procedurally, the buyer typically frames the suit as one for:

  • (a) refund of purchase money with interest/costs, and

  • (b) enforcement of the statutory charge under section 55(6)(b) on the property (or substituted security), including, where necessary, sale of the property and application of proceeds to satisfy the decree.


Limitation period: Courts (including Kerala High Court and the Supreme Court) have treated enforcement ofthis statutory charge as falling under Article 62 of the Limitation Act, 1963, giving 12 years from the date when the money secured by the charge becomes due, not 3 years as for a simple money claim. This applies even when the charge is enforced on substituted security. 


Buyer’s conduct (“improperly declined to accept delivery”):

The statute expressly provides that the charge exists “unless the buyer has improperly declined to accept delivery”; therefore, a substantial part of the adjudication is often whether the buyer’s refusal or non‑performance was “improper.” If the buyer is found to have improperly declined delivery, the statutory charge is lost; if not, the charge remains and can be enforced.


Recent Kerala High Court decisions have emphasised that where both sides drag their feet on performance, but the buyer has paid substantial consideration and is not solely at fault, the buyer will still be entitled to the statutory charge.


Core Supreme Court authority, along with helpful High Court decisions, includes:

1. Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. & Ors. , AIR 2000 SC 573;also reported at 2000(1) All MR 736 (SC)

  • Buyer’s charge under section 55(6)(b) is a statutory charge on the vendor’s interest.

  • Enforceable against the seller and all persons claiming under him.

  • Charge fastens on substituted security (converted property or money).

  • Limitation for enforcing the charge is 12 years from the date when the money becomes due (Art. 62).


2. AIR 2009 Kerala 2 (Kerala High Court) Recognises buyer’s charge under section 55(6)(b) as enforceable against seller and all persons claiming under him. Holds that limitation for enforcing such statutory charge is 12 years under Article 62 ,not 3 years.


3. Other instructive decisions collected in secondary research tools (for doctrinal support on scope and commencement of charge):

i). Puthiya Purayil Ramakrishnan v. Pullani Prabhakaran (Kerala HC, 2015),

ii). Hotel ChandraTowers Ltd. v. Henry Isidore (Madras HC, 2012) – on commencement and enforcement of buyer's charge.


Various High Court decisions compiled in recent analyses clarifying the requirement that the buyer must not have improperly declined to accept delivery.


From a practical litigation strategy perspective, how would you prefer to frame the prayer clause to maximise the enforceability of this statutory charge while preserving a simple money decree as an alternative?


Nature of the buyer’s statutory charge

Section 55(6)(b) gives the buyer a statutory charge on the seller’s interest in the property to secure the purchase money (and interest/costs), provided the buyer has not improperly declined to accept delivery. Courts have treated this as a charge created by operation of law,distinct from a purely contractual charge, but functionally similar to a security interest under section 100 TPA in many respects.


That charge is an actionable property right : it can be enforced by suit, binds persons claiming under the seller, and can even fasten on substituted security as per DDA v. Skipper Construction. 


Whether this right can itself be dealt with - assigned or mortgage - by the buyer.


There is no express statutory prohibition in the TPA against the assignment or further encumbrance of a buyer’s statutory charge under section 55(6)(b). Secondary commentary on charges under the TPA recognises that, as a general rule, any actionable claim or beneficial interest in property can be assigned, and a charge-holder may create a sub‑charge or mortgage over the charged interest, subject to the nature of the underlying right.


Doctrinally: The buyer’s right under section 55(6)(b) is a proprietary security interest , not merely a personal claim for money. Such a proprietary interest can, in principle, be assigned

(as an actionable claim) or used as security (mortgaged or sub‑charged) if the parties clearly intend to transfer or encumber the benefit of the charge, and the transaction complies with TPA requirements on assignment and mortgage (including writing and registration where necessary).


Courts in related contexts (e.g., contractual charges or equitable interests) have accepted that a beneficiary of a charge can deal with that charge, though there appears to be limited direct authority specifically on “assignment of a section 55(6)(b) charge” in reported case law. The absence of prohibition plus the general principles on transfer of actionable claims supports an answer in favour.


In practice, an assignment of the buyer’s statutory charge would be structured as

  • An assignment deed in writing, reciting:

  • The underlying sale agreement and payment of purchase money.

  • The existence of the statutory charge under section 55(6)(b).

  • The buyer’s intention to assign to the assignee:

  • the right to recover the secured amount, and the benefit of the statutory charge on the property (or substituted security).


Compliance with the law on assignment of actionable claims (section 130 TPA), including: Written instrument signed by the assignor. Proper notice to the seller and any subsequent transferees, so the assignee can assert the charge against “persons claiming under” the seller. Depending on how the right is characterised (actionable claim vs interest in immovable property), registration under the Registration Act may be advisable or required if the assignment purports to transfer a right in immovable property valued above the threshold;conservative practice would be to register.


A buyer who wishes to use the statutory charge as collateral can:

Execute a mortgage or sub‑charge deed in favour of a lender, expressly charging: The buyer’s beneficial interest under section 55(6)(b), i.e., the right to enforce the charge on the seller’s interest in the property for the specified amount and interest.


The deed should:

  • Identify the underlying property and sale transaction.

  • Clarify that the buyer’s statutory charge is being further charged in favour of the lender as security for the loan.

  • Provide that any amounts realised by enforcing the section 55(6)(b) charge will first satisfy the lender’s secured claim, subject to priorities.

Given that this relates to immovable property, such a mortgage/sub‑charge would ordinarily need to be registered to be effective and enforceable against third parties. Priority conflicts (between the original buyer and his mortgagee, and between them and subsequent transferees of the property) would be resolved using general principles of notice and registration under theTPA and Registration Act.


Conceptualise this right in a pleading or transaction document: as an “actionable claim secured by a statutory charge” or as a “beneficial interest in immovable property by way of charge,” and what are implications for registration and priority?


Step 1: Clarify the two rights involved 

Under section 55(6)(b) TPA, the buyer has: 

  • A personal right : a claim to get back the purchase money (with interest/costs) from the seller.

  • A proprietary security right: A statutory charge on the seller’s interest in the immovable property to secure that money, enforceable against the seller and persons claiming under him.


Courts and commentary treat this as a charge arising by operation of law, fitting within the broader concept of “charge” under section 100 TPA. It is not a title, but a security to realise the money paid.


Step 2: What is an equitable mortgage in this context? 

In Indian law, an “equitable mortgage” usually refers to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Under section 58(f) TPA—creation of a security interest over immovable property by depositing title documents with intent to create a mortgage, without a formal registered mortgage deed.


So the conceptual question is: can the buyer, who holds only a statutory charge (not legal title), equitably mortgage that charged interest


Step 3: Can the statutory charge itself be equitably mortgaged? 

The mortgagee’s right is a proprietary security in the mortgagor’s interest in the immovable property. So the conceptual question is: can the buyer, who holds only a statutory charge (not legal title), equitably mortgage that charged interest ?


There is no direct authority saying “a section 55(6)(b) charge can/cannot be equitably mortgaged," but applying general principles:


1. Nature of the buyer’s interest

  • The buyer does not have legal title to the property (section 54 TPA makes that clear),but has a charge over the seller’s interest to secure the advance. That charge is a proprietary security interest created by statute, not a mere personal claim.


2. Transferability/further encumbrance 

  • Charges created by law or contract are ordinarily capable of being assigned or further charged , unless the statute expressly prohibits it.

  • There is nothing in section 55 or section 100 TPA that prohibits the buyer from dealing with the benefit of the charge—courts have emphasised that section 55 is “elastic” and does not forbid parties from modifying or dealing with the rights it creates.


3. Equitable mortgage over the buyer’s interest

  • The buyer cannot deposit title deeds of the property (they are with the seller), so cannot equitably mortgage the property in the usual sense under section 58(f).

  • However, the buyer can treat his beneficial interest (the statutory charge plus the secured money claim) as an asset and create a sub‑charge or equitable mortgage over that interest in favour of a lender, by a suitable agreement or by deposit of documents evidencing his charged interest (e.g., the sale agreement, receipts, and an acknowledgment of the charge).


On principle, therefore:

  • The buyer’s interest under section 55(6)(b) can be equitably mortgaged as a security interest over a security interest (a sub‑charge), not as a direct mortgage of the immovable property itself.

  • The mortgagee then steps into the buyer’s shoes to enforce the statutory charge against the seller's interest, subject to general rules of notice and priority.


Step 4: How to structure an equitable mortgage over this statutory charge 

  • Practically, if you want to structure it:

  • The buyer and lender agree that the buyer’s statutory charge under section 55(6)(b) and the underlying debt (refund claim with interest) will stand as security for the lender’s loan.

  • The buyer deposits the key documents with the lender (sale agreement, payment proofs,any acknowledgment or decree recognising the charge) with clear intention to create a security over his charged interest—similar to deposit of title deeds, but here the “title” is to the charge and the money secured, not to the property.

  • The arrangement is documented (or at least evidenced) to confirm that the lender can, in default, enforce the buyer’s section 55(6)(b) rights directly, including filing or continuing suits to enforce the charge on the property or substituted security.


Because this is a more complex, two‑tier security, careful drafting and (ideally) registration of a short mortgage/sub‑charge deed are advisable to avoid disputes on nature and priority.


Given this, if a lender is taking security over a buyer’s section 55(6)(b) rights,frame the security clause to make it clear that what is being mortgaged is the buyer's statutory charge and the proceeds of its enforcement, rather than the underlying property itself ?


Disclaimer: The sole purpose of this article is for creating awareness and must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision, commercial or otherwise. One must do its own research or read the original text of the judgment or seek professional advice if it intends to take any action or decision using the material covered here.

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(Courtesy - Perplexity AI)


29 October 2025

Claims collated/admitted by IRP/RP constitute ack. under S.18 of the Limitation Act. & extend limitation.

Claims collated/admitted by IRP/RP constitute ack. under S.18 of the Limitation Act. & extend limitation.

Hon’ble NCLAT (2025.10.15) in Shankar Khandelwal Vs. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. [(2025) ibclaw.in 845 NCLAT, Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 293 of 2025 with Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 294 of 2025] held that;

  • This tribunal, therefore, holds that while the date of default in payment of the debt as mentioned in Part IV of the petition under Sec.7 IBC deserves to be factored in for the purpose of computation of limitation in instituting the petition, yet it is not always bound by it, as it has a statutory duty to perform under Sec.3 of the Limitation Act.

  • This would signify the keenness of both the Court and the legislature to preserve the right to repayment of debt- dues when the latter included Sec.238A of the Code and the former did not attempt to stretch the effect of Article 137 of the Limitation Act to obliterate the effect of its other provisions.

  • In the instant case, if the date of default is reckoned as 16.11.2016 or 23.11.2016, the SRA of the creditor has still made its Claim before the IRP or the RP in the first CIRP against the CD within 12 years, when the right to enforce the right to recover secured debt is still alive and not barred by limitation.

  • Admission of a Claim either by the IRP or the RP would amount to admission of a liability of the CD to repay the creditor, to emphasis, based on a pre-existing and enforceable right of payment. And, acknowledgement of a debt within the meaning of Sec.18 of the Limitation Act in essence is but an admission of the liability to repay.

  • A mere choice of expression such as ‘acknowledgement’ or ‘admission’ used in different statutory schemes cannot alter the fundamentals: existing of a liability, correlatable to a pre-existing and enforceable right to repayment.

  • Therefore, where an IRP or a RP has admitted a claim, it does constitute an acknowledgement under Sec.18 of the Limitation Act. To state it differently, if the RP has the authority to admit a claim and if admission of a Claim also constitutes an acknowledgement of liability, it follows that the RP has the authority to acknowledge a liability on behalf of the CD.

  • There is therefore, little difficulty in holding that the date of admission of a Claim by the IRP grants a fresh date for commencement of limitation and when the Claims are subsequently updated it pushes the date of terminus a quo to that date.

  • This tribunal holds that that the admission of the Claim by the RP in the first CIRP against the CD on 22.05.2022 constituted a valid acknowledgement and its subsequent updating on 21.02.2024 constituted the second acknowledgement, and if terminus a quo is reckoned from any of these dates, then both the petitions laid by the respondent are validly instituted as the debts are not time barred on the respective dates when they were so instituted.

Link Synopsis ]


Contra view;

2. Let’s notice the provisions of the Code & The Limitation Act.

2.1. The Limitation Act.

  • Sec.3 Bar of limitation:

  • Subject to the provisions contained in Sec.4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.


2.2. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

  • Sec. 3. Definitions. –

  • XXXX

  • (6) “claim” means

  • (a) a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;

  • (b) right to remedy for breach of contract under any law for the time being in force,  if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured;

  • XXXX

  • (11) “debt” means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a financial debt and operational debt;


3. Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.K. Educational Services Private Limited Vs. Parag Gupta and Associates [Civil Appeal  No.23988 of 2017] noticed the proposition that debts “due and payable” must be differentiated from debts “due and recoverable”.

  • “ In the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay [AIR 1958 SC 328] it has been held that when the debt becomes time-barred the amount is not recoverable lawfully through the process of the court, but it will not mean that the amount has become not lawfully payable. Law does not bar a debtor to pay nor a creditor to accept a barred debt.”


4. The claims (a right to payment) as defined under section 3(6) are admitted/collated by IRP and updated by RP are governed by the “Doctrine of Debts due & Payable” whereas the limitation is looked into while filing insolvency application following the “Doctrine of Debts Due and Recoverable”. Thus, admitting or collating the claims by IRP and or updating of the claims by RP, does not have any nexus with extension or fresh start of limitation of the underlying debt.


5. Hon’ble SCI (1992.04.20) Punjab National Bank And Ors vs Surendra Prasad Sinha (Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1992.) held that;

  • "The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy  the rights of the parties.  Section 3 of  the Limitation Act only bars the remedy, but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. The right to  the debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by the limitation. Only exception in which the remedy also becomes  barred  by limitation is the right is destroyed.  Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process  is barred, the right to debt remains. The time barred debt does not cease to exist by reason of s.3. That right can be exercised in any other manner than by means of a suit. The debt is not extinguished, but the remedy to enforce the liability is destroyed.  What s.3. refers only to the remedy but not to the right of the creditors. Such debt continues to subsists so long as it is not paid. It is not obligatory to file a suit to recover the debt."


6. In the above mentioned judgement Hon’ble Appellate Authority has merged the identity of IRP/RP with the identity of Corporate Debtor. Now the following question arise;

  1. Whether IRP/RP can create any liability for CD ?


IRP/RP works as custodian of CD for the specific purpose of Resolution of insolvency of the corporate debtor. He is neither authorised to create any liability of CD, nor acknowledge any liability of the CD during CIRP. Insolvency Resolution Process Cost (IRPC) is neither treated as liabilities of CD, nor mentioned in Information Memorandum as part of assets & liabilities of the CD. Even the cost of operation of the CD, of a going concern during CIRP is part of IRPC, along with other expenses & fees etc. [section 5(13)], treated separately under the resolution plan.


Disclaimer: The sole purpose of this blog is to create awareness on the subject and must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision, commercial or otherwise. One must do his own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this blog.

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