30 September 2026

Do Statutory First Charges Survive an IBC Liquidation Sale?

 Do Statutory First Charges Survive an IBC Liquidation Sale?

Introduction

A recurring issue in insolvency proceedings is whether government dues or other operational-creditor claims attached to the property of a corporate debtor continue to bind the purchaser after the property is sold during liquidation under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”).


The issue generally arises in two forms:

  1. Whether government dues survive the liquidation process, particularly where the claim was not filed, or was filed belatedly, before the liquidator.

  2. Whether a statutory first charge created over the corporate debtor’s property survives the liquidation sale and can subsequently be enforced against the auction purchaser.


The emerging position is that an auction purchaser in an IBC liquidation sale ordinarily acquires the asset free from the corporate debtor’s past liabilities and pre-existing claims, unless the sale terms or the applicable order expressly provide otherwise. The statutory charge does not operate independently of the insolvency process and must be considered alongside the Code’s claims procedure and distribution mechanism.


IBC liquidation is different from SARFAESI enforcement

The distinction between an auction under the SARFAESI Act and a liquidation sale under the IBC is fundamental.


A SARFAESI auction is ordinarily conducted by a secured creditor to enforce its own security interest. The proceeds are principally connected with the enforcement of that creditor’s security.


By contrast, a liquidation sale under the IBC is conducted as part of a collective insolvency process. Its purpose is to realize the value of the corporate debtor’s assets and distribute the proceeds among stakeholders in accordance with the statutory waterfall under Section 53 of the IBC.


Therefore, principles applicable to a secured creditor’s enforcement sale under SARFAESI cannot automatically be imported into an IBC liquidation sale.


This distinction is also reflected in Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act, which gives secured creditors priority over government dues after registration of the security interest. However, the explanation to Section 26E expressly recognises that, where insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings are pending, the priority of secured creditors is subject to the provisions of the IBC.


Accordingly, the IBC occupies the field once liquidation proceedings are underway.


Claims must be submitted in the liquidation process

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 require stakeholders to submit their claims to the liquidator.

Regulation 16 provides, among other things, that:

  • A person claiming to be a stakeholder must submit its claim, if it was not submitted during the corporate insolvency resolution process, within the prescribed period from the liquidation commencement date.

  • The claimant must prove the debt or dues as they stood on the insolvency commencement date.

  • The stakeholder must update the claim where it is subsequently satisfied, wholly or partly, from any source.


This framework is important because the liquidation process is intended to identify, verify and settle the claims against the corporate debtor in an orderly manner. A government authority or other creditor cannot ordinarily bypass this process and seek recovery directly from the purchaser after the liquidation sale has concluded.


The existence of a statutory charge may establish the character or priority of a claim against the corporate debtor. It does not necessarily confer an independent right to proceed against an auction purchaser after the asset has been sold under the IBC.


NCLT: Pre-sale dues cannot be recovered from the purchaser

In M/s Sri Gomathi Energy Private Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., the NCLT, Chennai Bench-II considered claims relating to dues arising before the liquidation sale.

The Tribunal held that once the liquidation sale had been completed, the sale certificate had been issued and possession had been handed over to the auction purchaser, pre-sale dues relating to the property could not be raised against the purchaser. This was particularly so where:

  • The company was undergoing liquidation.

  • The concerned authority had already approached the liquidator.

  • The authority’s claim had not been admitted because it was filed belatedly.

  • The purchaser had acquired the property through the liquidation process.


The Tribunal therefore concluded that the auction purchaser could not be made liable for dues arising before the purchase of the property.


The decision illustrates an important practical principle: a claimant that has approached the liquidator must pursue its remedy within the liquidation framework. It cannot, after completion of the sale, shift the burden of the corporate debtor’s historical dues onto the purchaser.


NCLAT: Section 53 distribution extinguishes past claims

The NCLAT adopted a similar approach in M/s Shiv Shakti Inter Globe Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s KTC Foods Private Limited.

The case concerned the sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern. The Appellate Tribunal held that once the sale proceeds had been distributed in accordance with Section 53 of the IBC, claims inconsistent with that statutory distribution could not subsequently be enforced against the purchaser.

The NCLAT specifically observed that:

  • Claims cannot be entertained contrary to the Section 53 waterfall after distribution of the sale proceeds.

  • Government entities cannot subsequently claim past unpaid or outstanding dues from the purchaser.

  • The objective of the IBC is to extinguish past claims and enable the purchaser to commence operations on a “clean slate”.

  • A purchaser cannot be burdened with past liabilities that were not mentioned in the sale notice.


The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. and Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, which emphasizes the need for certainty and finality in insolvency resolutions and sales.


Although the decision concerned a going-concern sale, its reasoning is relevant to the broader question of whether unprovided-for historical liabilities can be imposed on an insolvency purchaser after the sale.


NCLT: The purchaser acquires assets free from encumbrances

In Gaurav Jain v. Sanjay Gupta, the NCLT, Mumbai Bench-I examined the effect of a liquidation sale on the liabilities of the corporate debtor.

The Tribunal held that the sale consideration received by the liquidator would be distributed among creditors in accordance with Section 53 of the IBC. Once the liabilities were dealt with through that statutory mechanism, the purchaser acquired the assets without encumbrances or charges and free from action by the creditors.


The Tribunal also distinguished an ordinary sale of a going concern from a going-concern sale during liquidation. In an ordinary commercial transaction, a going concern may involve the transfer of assets together with liabilities. In an IBC liquidation sale, however, the liabilities of the corporate debtor are dealt with through the liquidation process, while the purchaser acquires the assets without the corporate debtor’s past encumbrances and liabilities.


Does a statutory first charge survive?

A statutory first charge may give the government or another statutory creditor priority over other creditors under the relevant legislation. However, the existence of such a charge should not be treated as conclusive on the question of the purchaser’s liability.


The following distinctions are important:

Issue

Position in an IBC liquidation

Existence of statutory charge

May determine priority of the claimant against the corporate debtor or liquidation estate

Filing of claim

The claimant must ordinarily submit and prove its claim before the liquidator

Distribution of sale proceeds

Governed by the IBC, particularly Section 53

Liability of auction purchaser

Ordinarily does not extend to the corporate debtor’s pre-sale dues

Unfiled or belated claims

Generally cannot be revived against the purchaser after completion of the sale

Sale certificate and possession

Strengthen the purchaser’s claim to acquire the asset free from historical liabilities

Terms of sale

Must be examined carefully because express conditions may affect the purchaser’s rights


Thus, a statutory first charge may survive for the limited purpose of determining the claimant’s entitlement or priority within the liquidation estate. It does not automatically survive against the asset in the hands of an IBC auction purchaser.


The decisive question is not merely whether the charge existed before the sale. The broader question is whether the charge and the underlying dues were dealt with in accordance with the IBC, the liquidation regulations, the sale notice and the terms of the sale.


Practical implications

The position has important consequences for both purchasers and government authorities.


For auction purchasers

A prospective purchaser should conduct due diligence on:

  • The liquidation order and appointment of the liquidator.

  • The sale notice and its terms.

  • The liquidator’s disclosures concerning encumbrances and statutory dues.

  • Claims submitted by government authorities and other operational creditors.

  • Orders approving the sale and issuing the sale certificate.

  • Whether possession has been formally handed over.

  • Whether any court or tribunal has specifically preserved a particular charge or liability.

The purchaser should also seek suitable language in the sale documents confirming that the asset is being sold free from past liabilities, encumbrances and claims, subject to the terms approved by the adjudicating authority.


For government authorities and other creditors

A statutory authority should:

  • Lodge its claim within the prescribed period.

  • Provide documentary proof of the dues and the statutory basis of the charge.

  • Participate in the liquidation process.

  • Object to the proposed sale, where appropriate, before the sale is completed.

  • Clearly communicate the effect of the statutory charge to the liquidator and the adjudicating authority.


A failure to pursue the claim during the insolvency process may make it difficult to enforce the dues against the purchaser after the sale.


Conclusion

The better view is that statutory dues and statutory first charges must be worked out within the IBC liquidation process. A charge may affect the priority of distribution from the liquidation estate, but it does not ordinarily authorise the claimant to recover pre-liquidation dues directly from an auction purchaser after the sale has been completed.


Where the sale certificate has been issued, possession has been handed over and the sale proceeds have been dealt with under Section 53, the purchaser is generally entitled to acquire the asset on a clean-slate basis. Past government dues or other operational-creditor claims that were not properly pursued in the liquidation process should not ordinarily be fastened upon the purchaser.


The final outcome will, however, depend on the precise statutory provision creating the charge, the wording of the sale notice, the order approving the sale, the conduct of the claimant during liquidation and any specific direction issued by the adjudicating authority.


Recovery by the statutory first charge holder post liquidation process will be in contravention to the statutory waterfall specified in section 53.


Disclaimer: The sole purpose of this blog is to create awareness on the subject and must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision, commercial or otherwise. One must do his own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this blog.

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26 September 2026

Related-Party Financial Creditors under the IBC

Related-Party Financial Creditors under the IBC, Voting Exclusion, Section 53 Priority and Liquidation-Value Protection

Introduction

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) treats a related-party financial creditor differently for Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) participation, but not necessarily for distribution under the liquidation waterfall. This distinction becomes important where a related-party financial creditor is secured or unsecured and is excluded from voting under the first proviso to Section 21(2).


Two questions arise:

  1. Can a related-party financial creditor be placed in a different category from other secured or unsecured financial creditors under Section 53?

  2. Does the liquidation-value protection available to operational creditors and dissenting financial creditors extend to a related-party financial creditor that has no voting rights?


The better view, supported by the statutory structure and the authorities discussed below, is that related-party status does not create a separate rank under Section 53. However, a related-party financial creditor excluded from voting does not automatically obtain the liquidation-value floor applicable to a dissenting financial creditor under Section 30(2)(b)(ii).

Section 21: exclusion from CoC participation


The first proviso to Section 21(2) provides:

“Provided that a financial creditor who is a related party of the corporate debtor shall not have any right of representation, participation or voting in a meeting of the committee of creditors.”


The provision is directed at the creditor’s role in the CoC. It does not state that the underlying debt ceases to be financial debt, or that the creditor becomes an operational creditor.


This distinction was explained by the Supreme Court in Phoenix Arc Private Limited v. Spade Financial Services Limited, (2021) 3 SCC 475. The Court held that the exclusion under the first proviso to Section 21(2):

“is related not to the debt itself but to the relationship existing between a related party financial creditor and the corporate debtor.”


The purpose of the exclusion is to prevent a related party from exercising influence over the insolvency process when its interests may conflict with those of independent creditors. The exclusion therefore concerns CoC governance, not the statutory identity of the creditor.nclt.gov+3


A related-party creditor remains a financial creditor, subject to the statutory consequences of its related-party status.


Section 53 does not create a related-party category

Section 53 establishes the order of priority for distribution in liquidation. Its relevant structure is based on:

  • liquidation and insolvency-resolution costs;

  • workmen’s dues and debts owed to secured creditors who relinquish security;

  • employee dues;

  • unsecured financial debts;

  • government dues and unpaid secured-creditor claims after enforcement; and

  • remaining debts and dues.


Section 53 does not create an independent category for “related-party financial creditors.” Its classification is based principally on the character of the debt and the creditor’s security position.


Accordingly, a secured related-party financial creditor and a secured unrelated financial creditor are ordinarily dealt with according to the applicable secured-creditor provision. Similarly, an unsecured related-party financial creditor falls within the category of unsecured financial debts under Section 53(1)(d), unless the claim is otherwise found not to constitute a genuine financial debt.


The NCLAT’s decision in Times Innovative Media Limited v. Pawan Kumar Aggarwal (Liquidator) & Anr. is particularly relevant. The tribunal held that an unsecured financial creditor’s priority under Section 53 is not displaced merely because the creditor is a related party. The principle was expressed as follows:

“Section 53 of the IB Code, 2016 does not envisage any difference between unsecured debtors and related party unsecured Financial Creditors.”


The NCLAT consequently rejected the argument that an operational creditor should rank above a related-party unsecured financial creditor. It held that unsecured financial creditors fall under Section 53(1)(d), whereas operational creditors fall within the residual category under Section 53(1)(f).


The decision supports the proposition that related-party status, by itself, does not alter the Section 53 ranking of an otherwise valid financial debt.

Resolution plan versus liquidation distribution


A distinction must be maintained between:

  • distribution during liquidation under Section 53; and

  • payments proposed under a resolution plan under Section 30(2).


In liquidation, Section 53 supplies the statutory waterfall. If the claim is a valid financial debt, its position is determined by the applicable category under Section 53. The liquidator cannot ordinarily create a new category of “related-party financial creditor” and place it below other creditors of the same statutory class merely because of the relationship.


The position is different during CIRP. A resolution plan may propose differential treatment between creditor classes, provided that it complies with the mandatory requirements of Section 30(2), the regulations, and applicable judicial principles. A related-party financial creditor may therefore receive less, or even no payment, under a resolution plan where the statutory requirements for protected classes are satisfied.


This does not mean, however, that the resolution plan can rewrite the Section 53 waterfall for the purpose of an actual liquidation. Section 53 remains the benchmark where the Code expressly requires comparison with liquidation entitlement.


Section 30(2): statutory protection for specified classes

Section 30(2)(b) protects operational creditors. The resolution plan must provide for payment to operational creditors in the manner specified by the Board, subject to the statutory minimum linked to the amount they would receive under Section 53(1) in liquidation.


Section 30(2)(b)(ii) protects a dissenting financial creditor. It requires payment of not less than the amount payable to that creditor under Section 53(1) in the event of liquidation.


The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the statutory protection of dissenting financial creditors in DBS Bank Limited, Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Limited and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3. The Court recognised that a dissenting financial creditor is entitled to payment not less than the amount payable under Section 53(1) in liquidation.


These protections are not expressed as a general guarantee for every creditor who does not vote. They are linked to particular statutory categories:

  • an operational creditor under Section 30(2)(b); and

  • a financial creditor who dissents from the resolution plan under Section 30(2)(b)(ii).


Is a non-voting related-party creditor a dissenting financial creditor?

A related-party financial creditor excluded under Section 21(2), first proviso, cannot participate or vote in the CoC. It therefore does not cast a vote against the resolution plan.

This is conceptually different from a financial creditor who participates in the CoC and votes against the plan. The latter is a dissenting financial creditor. The former is a non-participating financial creditor.


Therefore, the better interpretation is that a related-party financial creditor does not become a dissenting financial creditor merely because the law prevents it from voting. The statutory condition of dissent is not fulfilled by mere exclusion from the voting process.


The distinction may be illustrated as follows:

Creditor

Voting position

Section 30(2) consequence

Operational creditor

Ordinarily no CoC vote

Protected under Section 30(2)(b)

Independent financial creditor voting against plan

Votes against

Protected as dissenting FC under Section 30(2)(b)(ii)

Related-party financial creditor excluded under Section 21(2)

Cannot participate or vote

Not automatically protected as a dissenting FC

Related-party financial creditor in liquidation

No CoC voting issue

Paid according to its Section 53 category, subject to validity of claim


The difficulty is that the related-party financial creditor is denied the very vote that would enable it to dissent. This creates a policy tension. Nevertheless, courts generally apply statutory categories as enacted and do not extend the Section 30(2)(b)(ii) protection by analogy.


Does Section 53 nevertheless provide protection?

The answer depends on the stage of the insolvency process.


In liquidation

Yes, the related-party financial creditor receives the benefit of its statutory Section 53 ranking, provided the underlying debt is admitted and valid. For example, an unsecured related-party financial creditor ordinarily falls within Section 53(1)(d), alongside other unsecured financial creditors.


That is not a special related-party protection. It is the ordinary protection flowing from the creditor’s classification as an unsecured financial creditor.

In resolution


Not necessarily. Section 30(2)(b)(ii) does not say that every financial creditor must receive its liquidation entitlement. It refers specifically to a dissenting financial creditor.


A related-party financial creditor excluded from voting is not, on the better view, a dissenting financial creditor. Consequently, its liquidation entitlement under Section 53 does not automatically operate as a minimum amount payable under the resolution plan.


This produces an apparent asymmetry:

  • if the company enters liquidation, the related-party financial creditor receives the benefit of the applicable Section 53 category; but

  • if a resolution plan is approved, the creditor may not receive the Section 53 amount merely because it was excluded from voting.


That asymmetry results from the statutory distinction between liquidation distribution and minimum payments under a resolution plan.


Important qualification: validity and character of the debt

The conclusion that related-party status does not alter Section 53 ranking assumes that the claim is a genuine and admissible financial debt.


A related-party claim may still be challenged on other grounds, including:

  • absence of disbursement against the consideration for the time value of money;

  • sham, collusive or circular transactions;

  • lack of genuine commercial effect;

  • extinguishment, waiver or subordination under the transaction documents;

  • treatment as capital contribution rather than debt; or

  • statutory exclusion under the IBC or applicable regulations.


In Phoenix Arc, the Supreme Court’s discussion also emphasised the need to examine collusive transactions and the real nature of the financial arrangement. Thus, the proposition that Section 53 does not distinguish between related-party and unrelated financial creditors does not prevent adjudication of whether the claim is, in substance, a genuine financial debt.


If the claim is not a genuine financial debt, the creditor cannot invoke Section 53(1)(d) merely by labelling the amount as a loan.


Conclusion

The better legal position may be stated in four propositions:

  1. Related-party status affects CoC rights, not necessarily creditor classification. Under Section 21(2), first proviso, a related-party financial creditor cannot participate or vote; under Phoenix Arc, the exclusion relates to the relationship, not the character of the debt.

  2. Section 53 does not create a separate related-party rank. A valid secured or unsecured related-party financial debt is ranked according to its security status and the applicable Section 53 category. Times Innovative Media supports this position in relation to unsecured related-party financial creditors.

  3. Liquidation-value protection under Section 30(2) is class-specific. Operational creditors are protected under Section 30(2)(b), while dissenting financial creditors are protected under Section 30(2)(b)(ii).

  4. A related-party financial creditor excluded from voting is not automatically a dissenting financial creditor. Its non-voting status does not, by itself, create a Section 30(2)(b)(ii) liquidation-value floor during CIRP. In liquidation, however, the creditor remains entitled to the applicable Section 53 treatment, subject to the validity and admissibility of its claim.


The principal unresolved policy issue is whether denying a related-party financial creditor the right to vote should also deny it the statutory minimum available to a dissenting financial creditor. Unless the legislature or a binding higher judicial authority addresses that anomaly, the stronger textual position is that non-participation is not dissent, and that the Section 30(2)(b)(ii) floor cannot be extended by analogy.


B. Thus, a related party operational creditor is on better footing for distribution in CIRP.

On a close reading of the IBC scheme and the authorities, a related-party operational creditor is indeed in a better position than a related-party financial creditor in at least two critical respects: (i) entitlement to a liquidation-value floor under Section 30(2)(b), and (ii) ranking in liquidation under Section 53 in many fact patterns.


1. Statutory protection under Section 30(2)(b)

Section 30(2)(b) is expressed in terms of operational creditors, without carving out “related-party operational creditors” as an excluded class.

  • Section 30(2)(b), IBC: A resolution plan must provide for payment to operational creditors in the manner specified by the Board, which shall not be less than the amount they would receive under Section 53(1) in liquidation (or the liquidation value, as specified).


There is no parallel provision that says “operational creditors who are related parties shall not be entitled to the Section 30(2)(b) minimum.” By contrast, the Code does expressly strip related-party financial creditors of CoC rights under Section 21(2), first proviso, but it does not strip related-party operational creditors of their Section 30(2)(b) protection.


Consequently:

  • A related-party operational creditor is entitled to at least the liquidation-value amount (or the amount computed under the applicable regulation) in a resolution plan.

  • A related-party financial creditor who cannot vote is not a dissenting financial creditor and therefore does not automatically get the Section 30(2)(b)(ii) floor.

This already places the related-party operational creditor on a stronger footing in CIRP.


2. Liquidation ranking under Section 53

In liquidation, the position is more nuanced but often still favours the operational creditor where the alternative is a related-party financial creditor whose claim is vulnerable to challenge.

(a) Plain Section 53 ranking

On a plain reading of Section 53(1):

  • Unsecured financial debts fall under Section 53(1)(d).

  • Operational debts (to the extent not covered earlier) generally fall under the residual category in Section 53(1)(f).


In that sense, an unrelated unsecured financial creditor ranks above an operational creditor.

However, where the unsecured financial creditor is a related party, two additional considerations arise.


(b) Vulnerability of related-party financial claims

Related-party financial claims are frequently scrutinised on grounds such as:

  • whether there was actual disbursement against consideration for the time value of money;

  • whether the transaction was collusive, circular or colourable;

  • whether the advance was, in substance, a capital contribution rather than a loan; or

  • whether the claim should be subordinated on equitable grounds.


If a related-party financial claim is recharacterised, disallowed or subordinated, the operational creditor may in practice receive a larger share, or the related-party financial creditor may be pushed below operational creditors in the distribution.


By contrast, an operational debt (for goods, services, employment or statutory dues) is usually more straightforward to establish and less susceptible to being recharacterised as equity.


(c) NCLAT’s approach in Times Innovative Media

The NCLAT in Times Innovative Media Ltd. v. Pawan Kumar Aggarwal (Liquidator) & Anr. held that Section 53 does not distinguish between related-party and unrelated unsecured financial creditors, and that unsecured financial creditors rank above operational creditors.


That decision supports the view that, if the related-party financial claim is admitted as a genuine unsecured financial debt, it will rank above operational creditors under Section 53(1)(d).


Even so, the operational creditor retains the Section 30(2)(b) protection in resolution, while the related-party financial creditor does not enjoy a corresponding Section 30(2)(b)(ii) protection if it cannot vote.


3. CoC composition and voting

There is a third, structural reason why a related-party operational creditor can be better off:

  • Related-party financial creditors are expressly barred from representation, participation and voting in the CoC under Section 21(2), first proviso.

  • Operational creditors, whether related or not, are generally not members of the CoC and do not have voting rights, except in the narrow situations where there are no financial creditors or all financial creditors are related parties (Regulation 16 of the CIRP Regulations).


Thus, neither class typically votes. But only the operational creditor class has a statutory minimum payment floor in resolution. The related-party financial creditor has neither voting rights nor a guaranteed minimum.


4. The resulting asymmetry

Putting these threads together:

  • A related-party operational creditor:

    • Is entitled to the Section 30(2)(b) minimum (liquidation value or as specified) in a resolution plan.

    • In liquidation, ranks according to Section 53(1)(f) (or other applicable head), but its claim is usually less vulnerable to recharacterisation than a related-party financial claim.

  • A related-party financial creditor:

    • Is excluded from CoC voting under Section 21(2), first proviso.

    • Does not automatically qualify as a dissenting financial creditor and therefore lacks the Section 30(2)(b)(ii) floor.

    • In liquidation, may rank above operational creditors under Section 53(1)(d) if the claim is admitted as a genuine unsecured financial debt, but the claim is more exposed to challenges on validity, character and subordination.


The net effect is that the related-party operational creditor enjoys a statutory liquidation-value guarantee in resolution and a relatively more secure claim profile, whereas the related-party financial creditor suffers both governance exclusion and absence of a parallel statutory minimum.


5. Policy tension

  • The Code excludes related-party financial creditors from CoC voting to prevent conflicts of interest.

  • But by denying them the ability to dissent, it also denies them the protective floor that attaches to dissent under Section 30(2)(b)(ii).

  • Meanwhile, a related-party operational creditor, who also does not vote, retains the Section 30(2)(b) protection because the statute does not exclude related-party operational creditors from that class.


Unless and until the legislature or a binding higher judicial authority addresses this asymmetry, the stronger textual position remains:

  • Related-party operational creditors are protected under Section 30(2)(b).

  • Related-party financial creditors excluded from voting are not entitled to protection under Section 30(2)(b)(ii).


In the current statutory scheme and case law, a related-party operational creditor is on a better footing than a related-party financial creditor who lacks voting rights.


Disclaimer: The sole purpose of this article is for creating awareness and must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision, commercial or otherwise. One must do its own research or read the original text of the judgment or seek professional advice if it intends to take any action or decision using the material covered here.


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